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Abstract: This chapter reads law and time scholarship through social reproduction 
theory in arguing that the right to the continuous improvement of living conditions 
(CILC) could work as an entangled legal form that reproduces temporality. Such rights-
work thinks about the legal reproduction of time as a necessary dimension of this right, 
in order to flesh out the temporal infrastructure which is socially necessary to make a 
right to CILC thrive.  The right holds out a fruitful lifeline that may provide a sheltered 
path away from the violence and could be thickened into a sturdier care infrastructure 
of soothing time, but could also become an overwhelming and frustrating tangle.  
Entangled rights are porous legal forms which reproduce time by selecting in the people 
and things that make law sustainable and restorative, even as they may also become 
exhausting and depleting. The right to the continuous improvement of living conditions 
could be such an entangled right through the legal reproduction of normative timeliness, 
material time and felt temporality 
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1. Introduction: On rights-work as legal reproduction  
In watching this collection build in response to Goldblatt and Hohmann’s call,1 I have 
begun to see this rights-work as a kind of collaborative legal reproduction.  We 
	
1 J Hohmann and B Goldblatt, ‘Introduction: Situating the right to continuous improvement of living 
conditions and considering its interpretations and applications’ this volume.  
	 2	
contributors to this collection have taken hold of an empty legal form and turned it into 
a range of legal beings that might thrive if supported, or might fade away.  Yet it quickly 
became obvious that the right to continuous improvement of living conditions2 was not 
as empty as we might have first imagined it to be.3  As we talked and wrote, wrote and 
talked, people and things tumbled out of the form and claimed attention. The possibility 
of fleshing out the right, a possibility that once seemed to take us down an open and 
free path, came to reveal a variety of expectations, some easier to handle than others.  
Chief amongst them perhaps was the concern that a commitment to continuous 
improvement of living conditions may buy into an extractive model of growth, one 
which depletes4 rather than restores.5  Others emerged through thinking about different 
rights infrastructures6 and their cultures, resources and likely effects in fleshing out the 
right.  When we scholars do this work of searching out rightful paths - watching how 
they are used, imagining how they might be, adopting resources from elsewhere in 
fixing them up - we take rights as material legal forms and reproduce them anew.   
We are not in full control of our reproductive labour,7 and this work pulls us in 
uncomfortable directions.8  There will be times when withdrawal from rights labour 
seems best because the rights have become encrusted with channels that divert 
resources away from those that need them.  But this work of imagining and actualising9 
what rights might be is socially necessary labour.  It offers a way of doing legal rights 
that is neither the promotion of a liberal progressive agenda nor a critical rights-
scepticism, but stays attentive to both while holding on to a materialist approach to the 
world.  Struggling over rights is socially necessary work because rights struggle is one 
of the life-making activities that is routinely denigrated and devalued by worldly 
	
2 The right is part of Article 11 of the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted 16 December 1966, entered force 3 January 1976) UNGA resolution 2200A (XXI) 
(ICESCR). 
3 J Hohmann, ‘Sources for a nascent interpretation of the right to continuous improvement of living 
conditions’, this volume. 
4	S M Rai, C Hoskyns and D Thomas ‘Depletion: The Cost of Social Reproduction,’ (2014) 16(1) 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 86.	
5  B Goldblatt, ‘The work of living – social reproduction and the right to continuous improvement of 
living conditions’ this volume; S Skogly, ‘The right to continuous improvement of living conditions 
and the human rights of future generations – a circle impossible to square?’ this volume; for an account 
of the problem withs an extractive property-based approach see M Davies, ‘Can property be justified in 
an entangled world?’, (2020) 17 Globalizations 1104.  
6 S Fredman ‘Measure for Measure’ this volume.  
7 M O’Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989).    
8	R	Chadwick,	‘On	the	politics	of	discomfort’	(2021)	Feminist	Theory	online	at	
doi:10.1177/1464700120987379.	
9 D Cooper, Everyday Utopias (Duke University Press 2013) 
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arrangements.  Feminists and other critical legal actors have come to occupy this terrain 
of rights labour by developing sets of practices which entail selecting in the people and 
things that might just push the legal form of rights in a direction that comforts and 
shelters.10  As we write, and as the writing feeds into other activities, we are actively 
reproducing those legal worlds and making law accountable to social reproduction. 
 I turn to the materialist feminist thought of social reproduction theory to help 
me make sense of this rights work because it calls for the identification of the actual 
ways that life-making activities contribute to capitalist social relations, and promise to 
make the world otherwise.11  As Ferguson 12  explains in her recent account of the 
development of social reproduction thought, the utopian dimensions of social 
reproduction theory are more evident in the autonomist Marxist feminist school,13 
while the more critical-of-the-world-as-it-is dimensions come through in those social 
reproduction theorists who continue to draw on a Marxist theory of value.14  Social 
reproduction theory has shown us how the continuous time needed for suturing 
reproduction and production together in liveable ways is extracted from gendered and 
marginalised bodies with no return.15  If social time can be filled out more slowly16 and 
	
10 M Enright, K McNeilly and F de Londras, ‘Abortion activism, legal change and taking feminist law 
work seriously’ (2020) 71 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly OA7; G Bhattacharyya, ‘The poetics of 
justice: aphorism and chorus as modes of anti-racism’ (2019) 27 Identities 53. 
11	D Alessandrini, ‘Of Value, Measurement and Social Reproduction’ (2018) 27(4)  Griffith Law 
Review 393; D Alessandrini, ‘Immaterial Labour and Alternative Valorisation Processes in Italian 
Feminist Debates: (re)exploring the ’commons’ of re-production, (2012) Feminists@Law 
<https://journals.kent.ac.uk/index.php/feministsatlaw/article/view/32>; I Bakker, ‘Social Reproduction 
and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy’ (2007) 12(4) New Political Economy 541; T 
Bhattacharya (ed) Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression (Pluto 
Press 2017); J Elias and SM Rai, ‘Feminist everyday political economy: Space, time and violence’ 
(2019) 45(2) Review of International Studies 20.  	
12 S Ferguson, Women and Work: Feminism, Labour and Social Reproduction (Pluto 2020).   
13 S Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle (PM Press 
2012). 
14	Such as L Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory, 2nd edn 
(Haymarket Books 2013). 
15 A	Mezzadri,	‘On	the	value	of	social	reproduction’	(2019)	Radical	Philosophy	
<https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/on-the-value-of-social-reproduction> 
16 On this point, social reproduction theory connects with critical race perspectives that document and 
critique the uneven exhaustion of differently situated racialised bodies, e.g. A Emejulu and F Sobande 
(eds) To Exist is to Resist: Black Feminism in Europe (Pluto 2020), including through accelerated rates 
of death, see R Gilmore Wilson, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis and Opposition in Globalizing 
California (University of California Press 2007), and erasure of entitlement to land through title 
registration, see S Keenan, ‘From Historical Chains to Derivative Futures: Title Registries as Time 
Machines’ (2019) 20(3) Social and Cultural Geography 283.  The commitment to a political aesthetics 
of slowness in the university is a kind of material intervention that seeks to challenge these dynamics 
of exhaustion, extraction and erasure and their infection of academic labour e.g. A Mountz et al, ‘For 
slow scholarship: A feminist politics of resistance through collective action in the neoliberal university’ 
(2015) 14(4) ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies 1235 <https://www.acme-
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sustainably, this allows us to imagine that a legal norm of continuous improvement 
could mean something other than a commitment to a linear, progressive and extractive 
continuity.  How the continuity of ‘continuous improvement’ takes legal form, and goes 
on to shape and be shaped by social worlds through that form, is a matter for rights 
labourers and their kin.  Social reproduction offers the potential to think through the 
content and the form of the right17 in ways which see, but distance themselves from, 
commodifying and extractive practices. Building on social reproduction theory’s 
concern for the non-recognition of time spent on life-making activities, 18  and its 
commitment to the valuing of time spent providing care on non-capitalist terms, I turn 
to scholarship on law and time 19  to flesh out how a legal form of continuous 
improvement of living conditions (CILC) might reproduce itself anew through rights-
work which selects-in less obvious sources.    
 Some scholarship on law and time addresses international human rights 
explicitly by asking questions about the progressive realisation of rights,20  or the 
cyclical monitoring of human rights implementation, 21  or delay in addressing 
injustices.22 But most of the scholarship on the relationship between law and time that 
I am drawing on here does not focus on international human rights in particular.  Rather 
I think it could be useful for thinking through the under-explored right to continuous 
improvement of living conditions, because it speaks to the more ephemeral intangible 
	
journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1058>; K van Marle, ‘Life is not simply fact’: Aesthetics, 
atmosphere and the neoliberal university’ (2018) 29 Law and Critique 293. 
17 For an earlier account of how the materialist legal analysis of rights as commodity forms needs to 
accommodate patterns of consumption and social reproduction, see R Fletcher, Legal Form, 
Commodities and Reproduction: Reading Pashukanis, in M Drakopoulou (ed) Feminist Encounters 
with Legal Philosophy (Routledge 2013) 138.   
18 Ferguson n 12 p 9 comments: ‘women do the majority – 75 per cent – of the world’s unpaid care and 
domestic work.  They spend up to three hours more per day cooking and cleaning than men do, and 
anywhere from two to ten hours more per day looking after children and the elderly.  Whatever the 
hardship or rewards of such work, it remains the case that those who govern our countries and 
economies do not recompense or adequately recognised it as a contribution to overall social wealth’.   
19 T Chowdhury, Time, Temporality and Legal Judgment (Routledge 2020); M Enright,	‘”No.	I	Won’t	
Go	Back	to	it”:	National	Time,	Trauma	and	Legacies	of	Symphysiotomy	in	Ireland’	in	E	Grabham	
and	S	Beynon-Jones	(eds)	Law	and	Time	(Routledge	2018);	E Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: 
Things, Form and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto Press 2016); C Greenhouse, A 
Moment’s Notice (Cornelly University Press 1996);  J Harrington, ‘Time’ in Towards a Rhetoric of 
Medical Law (Routledge 2017) chapter 4; S Keenan n 16; R Mawani, ‘The Times of Law’ (2015) 40 
Law and Social Inquiry 253; M Valverde, Chronotopes of Law (Routledge 2015);  
20	JN Erdman, ‘Theorizing Time in Abortion Law and Human Rights’ (2017) 19(1) Health and Human 
Rights 29	
21 K McNeilly, ‘Are Rights out of Time? International Human Rights Law, Temporality and Radical 
Social Change’ (2019) 28(6) Social and Legal Studies 817. 
22 KG Young, ‘Waiting for Rights: Progressive Realization and Lost Time’ in KG Young (ed) The 
Future of Economic and Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Enright n 19.   
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dimensions of the right.  Thinking about the right from a perspective which theorises 
law and time helps us identify the temporal particularity of the right, while also seeing 
its connections to other rights.   Secondly, the law and time literature approaches law 
as a diverse field of activity comprised of statute, cases, activist lawyering, and other 
processes of legal reproduction that move in and out of the terrain of international 
human rights.  These porous processes reproduce law as they take and make time by 
translating the apparently non-legal (e.g. evidence of the probability that a disease will 
develop in a particular time frame) into legal phenomena (e.g. legal standards for 
deciding when a claim for financial assistance or compensation is met), and back again. 
By drawing on the insights of scholarship on law and time, I show how rights labour 
might reproduce the legal form of CILC so as to flesh out alternatives to an extractive, 
flattening version.  
 First, I show how the scholarship on time and human rights is concerned with 
an overly linear approach to law’s sense of normative progress over time, and that this 
contributes to a critical attachment to the disruptive potential of an ‘untimely’ future as 
an alternative.  I argue that one way to avoid being limited by binaries of progress and 
disruption, is to build on this concern about the progressive time of human rights and 
engage with distinctions between the normative, material and affective dimensions of 
law’s timeliness, time, and temporality respectively. My hope is that such an 
engagement will facilitate future conversations between international human rights and 
other legal sources of rights.  If we can draw on senses of legal time that operate across 
constitutional,23 common law,24 statutory,25 and vernacular26 rights, this is likely to 
make a dialogue of mutual interest in ‘continuous improvement’ more relevant across 
different constituencies of rights labourers.  Different rights labourers will have 
	
23 Ibid; see also F de Londras on an ecosystem of constitutional interpretation, an ecosystem that could 
include judicial innovation with timely matters: ‘In Defence of Judicial Innovation and Constitutional 
Evolution in Laura Cahillane, Tom Hickey & James Gallen (eds) Judges, Politics and the Irish 
Constitution (Manchester University Press, 2016).  	
24 Chowdhury traces a spectrum of abstract and concrete adjudicative temporalities as judges make 
some factual contexts more proximate than others (n 19) 13; Mawani reads Parker through Bergson’s 
attachment to the flow of time to think about the common law as having duration and being in a state of 
becoming ‘oriented to the past while reaching to the unforeseeable future’ (n 19) 255. Ring shows how 
the Irish courts constructed a ‘dominion-centred’ approach to enable prosecutions of historical child 
sexual abuse cases by justifying a delay in reporting of abuse if the victim was under the dominion of 
the perpetrator, see S Ring (2017) ‘The Victim of Historical Child Sexual Abuse in the Irish Courts 
1999–2006’ 26(5) Social & Legal Studies 562.    
25 C Murray ‘Moving towards rights-based mental health law: the limits of legislative reform’ (2013) 
49 Irish Jurist 161.  
26 S Madhok, Vernacular Rights Cultures: The Politics of Origins, Human Rights and Gendered 
Struggles for Justice (Cambridge University Press 2021).  
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different expertise and motivation.  Making the most of a dialogue between them means 
imagining a multi-dimensional process which has points of connection and 
disconnection so that the dialogue can move things along, possibly in different but 
mutually supportive directions, and possibly at different paces.  When I use the label 
‘normative’ to draw attention to the parts of the scholarship which see some sense of a 
prescriptive timeliness at work, I am reading others reparatively27 for my purposes.  For 
example, I show how Harrington’s work on law as rhetoric28 provides insights which 
help me draw out normative dimensions of legal time, even though his main concern is 
with material and affective dimensions of law’s persuasive and rhetorical use of time.  
I identify enduring, punctual and porous time as evidence of light normative 
commitments in the persuasive rhetoric of common law, statute, and evidence-based 
methods of legal claim-making, respectively.  The material dimensions of law’s 
relationship with time allows me to put the older materialist attachments of social 
reproduction into conversation with a newer materialist approach to lively, or eager, 
objects.29  The vibrant matter of Grabham’s eager objects throws up concrete things, 
from cells to paperwork, that make a material difference to how time is counted.  Eager 
objects are social artefacts of a world which an older materialist sees as generating 
value for capitalism through the sequencing and synchronising of activities that suture 
together productive and reproductive worlds.   The third, felt, dimension of time draws 
our attention to the visceral sensations and knowing emotions that are felt as temporal 
legal arrangements send a charge through space, a charge which might calm things 
down, exert pressure, or express concern.  If legal sources can demonstrate such 
diversity and multidimensionality in the experience of time, then imagining and 
actualising the continuous improvement of living conditions as a legal form of time 
which replenishes rather than depletes becomes more tangible.  
 Thinking about how the legal form of continuous improvement could reproduce 
with these different sources of legal time offers a pathway that pulls against extractive 
	
27 A reparative reading is one that seeks out other contributions in the work for the purposes of 
enriching the ‘gene pool’ of critical perspectives; see E Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘Paranoid Reading and 
Reparative Reading; or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction is About You’ in 
E Kosofsky Sedgwick (ed) Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction (Duke University Press 1997).  






possibilities.  By pressing against a legal trend of ongoing relentless ‘improvement’ and 
doing more with less, it offers the possibility of a replenishing alternative, but one 
which knows its own potential for co-option.  This pressing seeks out a legal form of 
rights which refuses the flattening consequences of commensurable contractual 
exchange and the thinning effects of linear progression.  By watching and working 
law’s porosity, as social relations become legal and legal relations become social, we 
can make visible-for-use a thicker, multi-layered and circuitous series of connections 
between timely norms, materials and affects. Such a reproductive temporality of the 
continuous could animate the legal right by working its relationship with material 
resources and affective arrangements in generating continuous improvement of living 
conditions.  I argue that we might best think of the legal form of this right as ‘entangled’ 
since it holds different relations together and could go in different directions depending 
on how it is used.  In thinking through entangled rights, I’m working with one of  
Haraway’s knots of citation as an indicator of a mixed genealogy of knowledge, a knot 
that is crafted by weaver and fabric.30  I started to think about entangled legal forms 
while trying to make sense of everyday rights engagements as they connect different 
moments of reproductive in/justice.31  But the entangled forms of new materialists were 
also hovering in the air, with their feminist concern for the materiality of lively 
objects,32 a concern that has had significant influence on scholarship about law and 
time.  But my aim here is to think through the right to continuous improvement of living 
conditions from an ‘older’ materialist feminist perspective, one which sees connections 
with these other sources of knowledge, and imagines the right as fruitfully, if sometimes 
frustratingly, entangled.  How is such a right a legal form of social reproduction - a kind 
of legal reproduction we might say - as it reproduces with legal sources of normative 
timeliness, material time and felt temporality?    
In what follows, I show firstly how legal commitments to timeliness are not just 
a matter of good process, but carry normative dimensions, normative dimensions that 
could be light touch.  Progressiveness may be the default norm informing a sense of 
legal timeliness that rights labourers could put to work in the right to continuous 
	
30	D Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Duke University Press 2016) 
91.  
31 R Fletcher, ‘#Repealedthe8th: Translating travesty, global conversation and the Irish abortion 
referendum’ (2018) 26 Feminist Legal Studies 233, 244. 
32 E Grabham n 19; M Davies n 3; M Davies, ‘Material subjects and vital objects — prefiguring 
property and rights for an entangled world’ (2016) 22(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 37.   
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improvement of living conditions.  But other light legal norms of timeliness – 
disruptive, enduring, punctual - are also available for the legal reproduction of the right.  
The right may indeed become entangled as the interactivity of legal relations brings 
these different norms to bear on it.  That tangle may confuse and distract, but it could 
also become a kind of care infrastructure as rights labourers find sources of shelter in 
the different normative layers for reproducing continuity.  Secondly rights labour could 
reproduce continuous improvement by drawing on the material resources of care labour 
and lively objects.  It could synchronise and sequence the different rhythms and routines 
involved in juggling multiple materialities for counting time sustainably.  This 
synchronising and sequencing sometimes occurs by working with the micro-processes 
of time as the counting of cells or the predictions of drugs manuals provide speeds 
which expand or contract the pace of the sequence.  Thirdly, continuity might reproduce 
temporality by producing feelings, emotions and affects which hold up, or support, the 
people, things and relations of time–making and flesh out an ephemeral legal 
infrastructure for social reproduction.   
2. Social reproduction, legal time and the continuous improvement of living 
conditions  
All the care work, cleaning, and maintenance, and the work done within the 
health care system and in agriculture are indispensable infrastructure today. 
What are the criteria for declaring them as such? It is the fact that they 
express capital’s limit: what social life cannot do without in order to 
continue.33   
 
I turn to social reproduction theory in seeking out a materialist approach to the form as 
well as the content of rights, a materialist approach which sees the danger that 
‘continuous improvement’ will be mobilised by extractive social relations whatever our 
good intentions, but offers a hopeful alternative to paranoid 34  critique.   Social 
reproduction theory explains and values the life-making activities that contribute to 
capitalist economies by generating the people, shelter and community that labour power 
needs to reproduce itself. As Elias and Rai explain, social reproduction encompasses 
‘all of those activities involved in the production of life. This includes biological 
	
33 L Cavallero and V Gago, ‘Feminism, the Pandemic and What Comes Next?’ (Critical Times: 
Interventions in Global Critical Theory, 21 April 2020)  <https://ctjournal.org/2020/04/21/feminism-
the-pandemic-and-what-comes-next/> 
34 E Kosofsky Sedgwick n 27.  
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reproduction, the work of caring for and maintaining households and intimate 
relationships, the reproduction of labour, and the reproduction of community itself – 
including forms of social provisioning and voluntary work. Social reproduction also 
includes unpaid production in the home of goods and services and the reproduction of 
culture and ideology that stabilises (as well as sometimes challenges) dominant social 
relations’.35   
 Adopting a social reproduction perspective means that we consider, and value, 
those life-making activities that are necessary for the ‘continuous improvement of 
living conditions’ (CILC).  Social reproduction offers us resources which take us 
beyond binary approaches to production and reproduction.36  By focusing on the life-
making activities that are necessary for production’s generation of surplus value, social 
reproduction has traced a relationship between reproduction and production.  As care 
and cleaning work have been increasingly commodified in ways which generate 
precarious, gendered and racialised workforces, life-making activities are rendered 
productive, but stratified.37 The interactions involved in practical life-making activities 
may become extractive innovations of capitalist relations, in much the way that the 
flexibility colleagues practised for each other while ‘balancing’ work and family life 
has been taken up through governance as a means for stretching the worker into 
constant availability.38  But they may also be organised so to hold racialised patriarchal 
capitalism to account and generate the potential for a feminist world.  When feminist 
strikers withhold care, they generate shelter and sustenance for each other.39 If social 
reproduction offers us a materialist feminist theory which is concerned with tracing 
relationships between reproduction and production, and the many forms they can take, 
it also offers us a way to imagine engaging and valuing the work of life-making on its 
own terms.  And the legal labour of making rights work so as to claim necessary 
resources, build social infrastructure and generates spaces for life, becomes a kind of 
social reproduction.  This is why social reproduction theory offers a critical path beyond 
	
35 J Elias and S M Rai n 11.  
36	Mezzadri	n	15.		
37 S Colen, ‘Like a Mother to Them’: Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and 
Employers in New York’ in F Ginsburg and R Rapp (eds) Conceiving the New World Order  
University of California Press 1995). 
38 Grabham n 19 chapter 5; E Grabham, ‘Doing Things with Time: Flexibility, Adaptability, and 
Elasticity in UK Equality Cases (2011) 26(3) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 485.  
39 V Gago, ‘#WeStrike: Notes Towards.a Political Theory of the Feminist Strike’ (2018) 117(3) South 
Atlantic Quarterly 660; C Arruzza, ‘From Social Reproduction Feminism to the Women’s Strike’ in T 
Bhattacharya (ed) Social Reproduction Theory (Pluto Press 2017) chapter 10.  
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the materialist analysis of rights as commodity forms that flatten out social life.40  If we 
think about the practical human activity of making rights work for the production of 
life, this brings rights labour into view as a contribution to social reproduction.  This 
legal contribution is about making life liveable under, and even beyond, capitalism.  It 
offers hope that the legal lifeline offered by rights might become a way out, even as it 
also might become another thread in the capitalist machine.  If the right to continuous 
improvement is to deliver on such a potential then we need to identify how law makes 
time, and how legal time-making might contribute to critical rights labour. 
 One challenge is that much of the law and time literature is informed by 
theoretical perspectives which are not particularly visible in valuing social 
reproduction.  As Franklin has noted,41 new materialism and old materialism tend not 
to be put in conversation with each other.  I respond to Franklin’s provocation and argue 
that the new thing-focused materialist approach to timely reproduction may be put to 
work with an older value-focused materialist approach towards a feminist world of 
valuing the things that contribute to social reproduction.  If we understand the lively 
objects of a new materialist interest in time, as things which are made and remade, this 
can complement an old materialist interest in identifying the value of such re/making 
and organising it for non-capitalist purposes. By figuring out how different theoretical 
contributions speak to mutual interests in time, we make rights labour reproduce itself 
in a way which connects across theoretical constituencies.  
 A materialist perspective on the value of time, such as that provided by Rai and 
Elias,42 is important because it calls for continuity to be replenished.  Their work draws 
out the significance of invisible time spent suturing together productive and 
reproductive activities, and of its possible redirection. An old materialist approach to 
time has tended to emphasise the way that clock time organises labour power into 
blocks of time with deadlines that are commensurable and become the object of 
exchange.43  More recently, Adkins has argued that we are seeing event time displace 
clock time as the key mode of post-fordist organising of gendered labour.44  But social 
	
40 Fletcher n 17.  
41 S Franklin, ‘Sexism as a means of reproduction: Some reflections on the politics of academic 
practice’ (2015) 86 New Formations 15. 
42	N	11.		
43 C Everingham, ‘Engendering Time: Gender equity and discourses of workplace flexibility (2002) 
11(2-3) Time & Society 335.  
44 L Adkins, ‘Sociological Futures: From Clock Time to Event Time’ (2009) 14(4) Sociological 
Research Online 88.  
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reproduction theory helps us see time and continuity not just as clock time which passes 
us through the machinery of modern capitalism, and not just as the rhythms of the 
natural world, but as social time which is material in its need to be fed, nourished and 
sheltered while developing a world that works with natural rhythms as it lengthens the 
shadow of machine clocks.  A new materialist approach to time such as Grabham’s 45 
helps us see how eager objects and artefacts contribute to this process as they also 
participate in the suturing together of reproduction and production.      
 Watching how law reproduces with time helps us imagine, and actualise, what 
continuous improvement might be, and how it could work in multiple ways.  The term 
‘continuous’ directly invokes time by conjuring up a normative sense of a commitment 
to the enduring and ongoing.  The ‘continuous improvement’ also captures time 
indirectly as a material resource that is a dimension of the living conditions, which are 
to be continuously improved.  Working with the continuous improvement of living 
conditions can also be thought of as having an affective dimension because different 
feelings of exhaustion, elation, boredom and more are conjured up as rights work 
reproduces this commitment.  By drawing on the law and time scholarship to imagine 
what a right to continuous improvement might be, I consider the value of lively objects 
for the utopian dimensions of social reproduction theory and see the right as the kind 
of entangled legal form that connects and reproduces even as it holds, and is held by, a 
range of vibrant things.  This entangled right has a role to play in building and 
rebuilding social infrastructure as its legal form approaches time as a legal norm, as a 
collection of material resources, and as a felt legal arrangement.   
3. CILC as a multiple normative commitment to timeliness 
 
Working with a normative sense of continuous improvement does not have to commit 
rights reproducers to the kind of continuity we associate with capitalist extractive or 
liberal progressive social arrangements.  Rather reproducing with rights means that we 
can search for normative commitments that may be more faded in legal backgrounds or 
buried in legal processes and select them into the form of continuity that comes to 
occupy the right.  Even if rights labour works on uneven terrain, it is a labour which 
involves numerous processes of socio-legal translation and carries multiple normative 
commitments as a result.  As I show here, norms of progression, disruption, endurance 
	
45 Grabham (n 19) chapter 1.  
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and punctuation are among those available for legal reproduction of continuity.       
 When scholars of law and time show how ideals of timeliness come to operate 
as commitments that drive law along, they are drawing out the more normative 
implications of time-in-law.  Much of this work problematises au understanding of 
time as a passive medium through which law passes.46  Rather they draw out and 
criticise the assumption that timeliness, particularly the state’s timeliness, is measured 
by reference to linear progression and, what we might term, a modernist will to 
improve.47  The critique of linear timeliness has produced a desire for the untimely, as 
a ‘leap into the future’,48 a move which seeks to unlock the disruptive potential of the 
untimely as that which is not recognizable in the terms of the present.  For McNeilly 
untimeliness offers international human rights an orientation not just to the future, but 
to the radical possibilities of an unknowable future.49  This call for untimeliness 
represents a yearning for disruption and a break with the here-and-now of 
international human rights, a here- and-now that is constantly retrieving ‘the past as a 
source or rationalisation of present obligation’.50  The unknown untimely represents 
an open uncontaminated future for human rights, one which is ‘inherently open to 
unexpected voices and directions’,51 with their promise of novelty and excitement.  
This is a move from criticising the flattening, thinning effects of a commitment to 
linear progression towards valuing the disruptive, unsettling effects of breaking away 
from the line.  The challenge perhaps is to hold onto lines and breaks as one way of 
understanding the timely, and to welcome the exploratory generative possibilities that 
may come with turns to unknown times, while recognising the limits of the known 
and timely as they exist.  But other ways of knowing timeliness beyond the linear and 
disruptive as it moves in and out of international human rights call for recognition.  
 Parfitt has offered a modular approach to the history of international law as an 
alternative to the linear, link-in-a-single-‘progressive’-chain approach.52  She suggests 
that the historical time of international law can be organised into items in a frame, and 
taking the form of a shadow box assemblage of found objects and images, which may 
	
46	Mawani, Grabham, Chowdhury (n 19).   
47 Greenhouse (n 19) 
48 E Grosz, ‘The untimeliness of feminist theory’ (2010) 18(1) NORA 48, 49. 
49 McNeilly (n 21) 818 
50 A Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 166, 175. 
51 McNeilly (n 21) 824.	
52 R Parfitt, The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance 
(Cambridge University Press 2019) chapter 4.   
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be viewed from different angles. This sense of law’s time as a matter of on-going 
assemblage and retrieval takes us away from the linear norm of progression and instead 
offers the possibility of holding multiple norms together as we flesh out what the 
continuous might be.  If the normative timeliness of the continuous can be multiple then 
the form of the legal right can become visible less as something flattened and flattening 
and more as something layered, porous and entangled.    
 In anticipating how the legal form of CILC might be worked into being, it might 
be fruitful to pay attention to how time multiplies across other legal sources that have 
an impact on rights forms. Harrington has shown us how ‘rival modes of temporality’ 
work through law even as general forms such as precedent or statute seem attached to 
singular modes.53   Echoing Mawani’s depiction of the common law as enduring in a 
Bergsonian sense,54  Harrington notes that precedent is typically seen as producing 
enduring time, while statute produces punctual time as the adoption of legislation 
announces some significant legal change.55   The sense in which the common law 
doctrine of precedent conjures up enduring legal time is important since it captures one 
key dimension of law’s perceived contribution to social infrastructure as continuity and 
stability.  Legal order is represented as ongoing and ever present as precedent makes 
law reproduce by looking backwards to pick up the legal thread that it will carry 
forward, seamlessly.  But as Chowdhury56 has shown, the adjudicative temporality of 
judicial working of precedent sometimes makes the factual context disappear, and often 
has half-hidden modes of selecting certain factual aspects, modes whose discovery, 
application and reproduction become part of legal expertise.  For my purposes, this 
shows how the legal reproduction of continuity through common law reasoning is not 
exclusive, but works with other registers of time.  If even the legal forms of common 
law, with their deep attachment to duration, reproduce with diverse commitments to 
timeliness, then it becomes even more possible to see a right to CILC as having multiple 
commitments to progressive, disruptive and enduring time. If continuous improvement 
of living conditions is to endure as a legal form, the form itself will need to be sustained 
by selecting in timely legal knowledge in sustainable ways.    
	
53 J Harrington, ‘Time as a dimension of medical law’ (2012) 20(4) Medical Law Review 491, 495; see 
also J Harrington n 19 chapter 4.   
54	Mawani	(n	19).	
55	Harrington	(n	19)	73-74.	
56 T Chowdhury, ‘Temporality and Criminal Law Adjudication’s Multiple Pasts’ (2017) 38(2) 
Liverpool Law Review 187; see also Chowdhury n 19.  
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 In Harrington’s terms, the punctual legal timeliness of statute makes a different 
normative contribution to the relationship between law and time, because it is a legal 
form which is focused on facilitating legal change and a break with the past.  We might 
think then of punctual timeliness as contributing to an ephemeral legal infrastructure 
for social reproduction by providing a different kind of legal support, one which builds 
a legal system from discrete legal pieces that are separate from each other, as they fit 
together.  The punctual time of a statute that is normatively committed to change also 
operates in a non-exclusive way.  The different senses of normative timeliness that 
operate in, around and beyond linear progression of time and its future and past 
disruptions, give us a different way to understand the story of rights as legal forms that 
contribute, unevenly, to social reproduction. Thinking about different norms of 
timeliness as they actually exist in legal forms may give us a way of working rights 
with a light normative touch, and one that recognises and selects from co-existing 
multiple normative commitments.    
4. CILC as a collection of material resources for time  
 
Time becomes continuous as it is made and remade with material resources.  If we 
identify how material processes and things have the effect of re/making continuous 
time, then we can trace a form of rights that holds these resources together for 
replenishing, and makes CILC possible.  While old materialists tend to draw attention 
to the processes that generate value for capitalism as they organise time, new 
materialists are more interested in the energy that circulates through the unfolding of 
lively objects.   Even if each school of thought tends to avoid the preoccupations of the 
other,57  there is increasing interest in a dialogue between them.58   From an older 
materialist perspective, scholars such as Everingham59 have engaged with a Thompson-
inflected Marxist distinction between the clock time of the factory and the rhythmic 
time of social and environmental life, to draw out the significance of the time spent in 
domestic labour. She argues that making arrangements for feeding, clothing, and 
cleaning, involves not just the spending of time on care, but engages a kind of 
managerial labour which has to juggle multiple schedules and commitments.  Co-
ordinating the different schedules of household members by sequencing different 
	
57 Franklin (n 41).  
58	See	Hohmann	(n	29).		
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activities, so that the shopping gets done after work and before picking up the children, 
is labour which keeps capitalism going by softening the effects of work.60  While the 
clock and calendar of the marketplace will often take priority in being accommodated 
by this domestic juggling, Everingham shows us how domestic labour contributes to 
social reproduction by making time for other people.  This labour, or ‘conscious 
practical activity’,61 negotiates with the biological and communal rhythms that run 
through eating and other necessary activities, as well as accommodating the clock time 
of schedules geared towards market production.   By doing the background work of 
sequencing and synchronising the activities which contribute to social reproduction, 
domestic labourers generate value by making time available for others.  When the 
activities of domestic labour are commodified and stratified, the material process of 
juggling can be seen to move across reproduction and production.62  Activities such as 
mood management, though once associated with a domestic sphere of unpaid, 
sacrificial labour, have come to be recognised as occupying a key material role in the 
paid work-place, even if they get characterised as ‘immaterial labour’.63  A reproductive 
temporality, which enables, supports and replenishes this juggling of activities, calls 
for a legal form of continuity that holds things together by sequencing and 
synchronising.    
 Social reproduction theory is being revitalised as the pressure on care provision, 
even before the pandemic, demands renewed engagement with theory which values the 
withdrawal of labour and care from capitalist arrangements and its redeployment 
elsewhere.64  As feminists reinvent the strike so that it also entails more sporadic and 
less durational withdrawals of care, this social form makes the value of care visible as 
that which we cannot do without.65  One of the ongoing tensions in social reproduction 
theory is the degree to which it is held accountable to Marxist theories of value.66  
Ferguson claims that social reproduction feminists of the autonomist school (such as 
Federici) have not provided an adequate account of how social reproduction contributes 
to capitalism if not as commodifiable labour.  But this social reproduction theory is 
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giving value to the labour of re-arranging life-making on its own terms, and not on 
capitalist terms.  Federici and Gago draw out the significance of soup kitchens67 and 
communal gardens68 as sites of life-making activity, but life-making activity which is 
not accountable to capitalist production.  Other activities such as mutual aid 
neighbourhood group 69  and abortion support networks 70  organise support and 
sustenance in ways that refuse to be accountable to capitalism.  Time, which is spent in 
making more time for others through cooking, cleaning and caring, shows us how social 
reproduction may generate a non-capitalist care infrastructure.  The slow movement, 
including the version which seeks to re-organise the neo-liberal university,71 similarly 
explicitly intervenes into the accelerated paces and intense rhythms of universities, 
farms, and kitchens in order to claim space for doing otherwise.  These thinking 
activities forge a continuity with the material time that is given value and taken from 
us through capitalism, but sequence reproductive events so as to achieve a re-
arrangement of material time in a way that is sustaining and supportive.    
 This sense of time as a material resource that is reproductive has a materialist 
feminist sensibility in wanting to value time spent in making life.  Time may be natural 
but of a nature that is also always social, a social nature that is organised by the 
operations of the mechanistic clock, but may escape those operations.  This time is part 
of a socio-natural world which shapes and is shaped by labour, including rights labour.  
Grabham’s new materialist understanding of brewing time, shares this understanding 
of time as being re-arranged and shaped in the social world.  Building on Greenhouse, 
she is interested in displacing the understanding of time as a vacuum through which 
law passes.72  Time is not a neutral medium in which we exist, but a product of our 
(partial) being in the world, a product which may attach to and detach from that world 
and the beings in it.   
For Grabham, the material aspects of temporality are co-produced through the 
interaction of humans and non-humans, as objects emerge and make their presence felt.  
She looks at how time is made out of things in interaction, and gives us a way to identify 
how ‘small things’ – cells, documents – are brewed into legal time.  Stretches of time 
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take on a life of their own, but a life which does not begin or end just with itself.  
According to this understanding, continuous time can be made run differently 
depending on how non-human things interact with humans.  Grabham is interested in 
drawing out the significance of the things that are the objects of labour in the co-
production processes that she explores, rather than in the labour itself.  While her 
approach foregrounds the co-producing of time that happens as cell loads are counted 
and drug manuals are read, Grabham pays close attention to the activist lawyering for 
clients living with HIV/AIDS as the legal process through which time is brewed for 
clients.  This lawyering is socially necessary labour which facilitates the counting of 
cell loads and the reading of drug manuals for client-led purposes.  
The new materialist desire to focus on the liveliness, vitality or eagerness of 
objects and the vibrancy of matter gives old materialists and social reproduction 
theorists a way to show how material things take on life.  The legal labour of the activist 
lawyer goes the extra mile to work out ways of counting a client’s lifetime by reference 
to their viral load so that a disabled future comes into legal view for the purposes of 
making a claim.  This going the extra mile is a kind of social reproduction that is done 
in the site of productive labour.  It is a life-making activity that takes us beyond the 
binary of reproduction and production.73  The brewing of time with such eager objects 
could be thought of as a kind of legal reproduction, which joins with the juggling of 
material activities to make time for others.  Both forms of working material time, and 
juggling lively objects, show us the importance of sequences and synchronicities to the 
legal labour that reproduces a right to continuous improvement of living conditions.   
5. CILC as a felt arrangement of temporality 
Rights are typically figured as a kind of solution to some kinds of exhaustion as they 
promise a remedy for a lack of housing, or the loss of a loved one.  Being made wait 
for rights74 continues the felt experience of being neglected and abandoned by law, a 
continuity that pulses with intensity as waiting deepens and reiterates the trauma of 
neglect.  As Enright has shown, the delay and denial of legal remedies for historical 
injustices such as institutional abuse and obstetric violence deal a second blow to 
survivors.75  Reproducing with rights surfaces an anticipation that the rights labour will 
itself be exhausting, an exhaustion which falls unevenly on racialised, gendered and 
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classed bodies, even if moments of joy are shared along the way.  Knowing that the 
system can speed up when matters become characterised as urgent, and the uneven way 
this happens, becomes another source of frustration, if sometimes the motivating kind.  
As different feelings of exhaustion, joy, and urgency run through encounters with law 
they generate mood and atmosphere.  A sense of curiosity hovers in the legal air.  Could 
a legal form of continuity reproduce an atmosphere of shelter through the deployment 
of rights’ affective and emotional connections?    
Scholars of affect have thought us to appreciate the visceral embodied responses 
which move people and things along and contribute to our sense of ‘being in time’.76  
Feelings encompass a multitude. We might want to distinguish ‘emotions’ or those 
feelings that work with consciousness, and may even be rehearsed in their expression 
of anger, frustration and joy, from ‘affects’ as those feelings that are more visceral and 
spontaneous in their almost pre-conscious reaction to pain and pleasure.  Drawing on 
Bakhtinian chronotopes, or spacetimes, Valverde shows us how temporalities are 
enacted through legal rhetoric as space becomes charged and time ‘takes on flesh’.77  
This affective charging means that governance projects at the same spatiotemporal 
scale might well be distinguished by mood.  For Valverde, mood means ‘the ready-
made combination of affective and aesthetic elements that are widely used’78 and not 
idiosyncratic.  She gives the example of how the documentation of the effects of climate 
change on infrastructure will likely have very different governance responses 
depending on whether the prevailing mood is one of optimistic can-do reformism, or 
one of apocalyptic fatalism.  In thinking about how rights labour might combine 
different affective and emotional elements through a legal form of continuity, I turn to 
those who have shown us how practices of rendering likely, expressing concern, and 
translating travesty make a difference to the felt reproduction of temporality 
 Grabham’s activist lawyers picked over legal technicalities and mundane bits 
of evidence in order to flesh out temporalities of likelihood, uncertainty, and 
progression through the generation or modification of affects of pressure and urgency.79  
As lawyers move clients along towards a claim for disability by finding ways to turn 
HIV related cell counts and drug regimens into legal evidence of a qualifying illness, a 
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temporality of pressure with its atmosphere of anticipated fearful affects is generated.   
The use of timely material resources, with their affective dimensions, generates feelings 
and visceral sensations, which themselves go on to manage the use of timely resources.  
The feeling of being rushed along, or of being uncertain about the likelihood of 
something happening, is a sensual arrangement of time.  A temporality like likelihood 
meant that ‘more likely than not’ became the legal test for a future impairment as a 
result of living with HIV, a legal test which involved testing for antibodies in the here 
and now, and reading a likely, not certain, future from test results.  Generating this 
feeling of something being more likely than not provides a way of managing 
uncertainty and looking towards the future, without erasing the uncertainty or 
disconnecting the now from that future. If we understand continuous through the 
register of likelihood and continuous becomes more continuous than not, then the 
possibility for continuity to have different rhythms and intensities while keeping going, 
comes into view.    
  In Roele’s 80  review of Valverde’s Chronotopes, she talks about how the 
preambulatory practices of international law play with mood as they conjure up a 
community that has long existed, while fixing the expression of concern to the moment 
of creation through the grammatical form of the continuous present.  Preambular 
paragraphs set the mood of the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions as they 
express concern, condemn or, graver still, deplore81 activities that step outside the zone 
of acceptability.  Roele shows how this chronotope’s use of time, space and mood in 
evoking continuity had the legal effect of providing the UK with support for the 
otherwise unlawful war against Iraq.  Overcoming the fact of a 12 year hiatus between 
the UNSCR’s authorization of force against Iraq over the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
and the 2002 recognition of a material breach of Iraq’s obligations was made more 
plausible Roele argues by relying on the chronotope of the continuous threat as 
reflected in the grammar and language of the original’s preambular paragraph.  If the 
continuity of a concerning threat in a UNSCR can draw on the time, space and mood 
of its chronotope to render war plausible, perhaps the continuity of an improvement in 
living conditions can similarly put mood to work in generating a plausible atmosphere 
of sustainability.   
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 Rights movements, which have laboured long and hard to ‘translate a travesty’82 
by getting a right on the legal table, give us another perspective on the significance of 
a mood of continuous concern.83  Such movements teach us the importance of finding 
ways to claim the joy of achieving a rights gain while being attentive to the solemnities 
of simultaneous rights failures.84  The movement to repeal the eighth amendment and 
legalise abortion in Ireland was, is, an example of a campaign which achieved a 
momentuous legal change against significant odds and through a popular vote for 
constitutional amendment after 35 years of critique.  But it was, is, also one moment in 
an ongoing and continuous struggle for reproductive justice.  The moment of repeal 
may always be fixed to the joyful tears of the 25th May 2018.  But it is also intimately 
connected to all the other moments of continued struggle for repair of the heartache of 
forced adoptions, concealed burials, and bruised reproductive bodies that continue to 
reverberate and claim legal space.85  If continuity can work a mood of concern into a 
justification for war, continuity can also conjure up felt arrangements for joyful rights-
making, rights-making which provides shelter from the storm. 
6. Conclusion: Entangled legal forms  
A right to continuous improvement of living conditions needs to stand tall against 
practices of continuity which extract support and deplete supporters without return.  
Such a right could be informed by practices of continuity which work with timely 
norms, materials and feelings.  This means figuring out how to hold multiple normative 
commitments to continuity in place with a light touch, how to arrange time’s material 
resources sustainably through sequencing and synchronising, and how to generate an 
atmosphere of continuous shelter through rights’ felt connections.  Engaging with 
materialist scholarship on social reproduction and legal scholarship on time brings the 
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possibility of putting old and new versions of materialism into conversation with each 
other, and reproducing temporality anew.   This theorising also gives us a way to pick 
up the critique of binary approaches to timeliness in human rights, engage with different 
legal senses of time, and use an appreciation for reproductive temporality to flesh out a 
materialist feminist approach to rights form.   
If the right is to become capable of providing an alternative to the extractive 
processes associated with commodified forms, the legal form needs to foreground the 
significance of rights labour which does care work and builds indispensable social 
infrastructure.  Current older materialist approaches to rights forms remain focused on 
the way that rights extract commodity value, and implement a flattening exchange of 
apparent commensurables.  This critical work is important, and I count myself as a 
participant in it.86  But we need a theoretical means of articulating the material value of 
all the other ways of doing rights including in their vernacular forms.  When rights-
work is doing sustainable social reproduction and making life liveable, it takes the 
material legal form beyond the commodity-form since these rights are thick with 
multiple normative possibilities, layered in their sequencing and synchronous 
dimensions, and full of felt arrangements.   
  Moving from a legal context where time for social reproduction is extracted 
with little return, to one where it would be replenished, requires the transformation of 
the form of rights through its occupation.  Such occupations could make rights hold 
multiple matterings of timeliness, and make movement beyond the binaries of un/timely 
progress possible.  They would draw on material processes and things in reproducing 
continuity, and they would arrange affects and feelings so as to keep life moving along.  
The unwieldiness and multi-directionality of these rights occupations means that there 
is always the risk that they fail either by falling apart or by being captured and co-opted. 
But while they persist they throw out a lifeline which could become a thicker care 
infrastructure joining and supporting all those engaged in life-making activities.  
These entangled legal forms carry their social relations within the right and hold 
out a lifeline even as they absorb the right-holder into the entangled system.  Entangled 
legal forms of rights offer an alternative to the more conventional materialist approach 
to rights which sees them as commodity forms facilitating exchange and extraction.  
Entangled rights share the materialist understanding that such legal forms are likely to 
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overwhelm and exhaust, as entanglements wear rights-holders out and distract from the 
systems holding the tangles in place.  But tangled threads also offer a lifeline and shelter 
as they provide legal places for critical occupation and legal pathways through the 
violence.  If we can make these faint places and pathways more visible through pulling 
on the entangled legal form of a right to continuous improvement of living conditions, 
we can expand the collective work of transforming rights protections into the building 
blocks of another world. Such a materialist conception of rights as legal forms that 
reproduce with time could work concretely as international human rights, but also in 
collaboration with constitutional rights, common law rights, statutory rights, and 
vernacular rights.  Reproductive temporalities of entangled rights provide a hopeful but 
grounded alternative to the idea of rights as either instruments of progress or tools of 
commodification, an alternative which identifies rights work as a kind of reproductive 
labour.     
